"Your Majesties, Your Royal Highnesses, Ladies and Gentlemen, Economic theory relies on the assumption that economic agents may be likened to a "homo oeconomicus". This fictitious individual is usually governed by self-interest and makes his economic decisions by rationally evaluating the consequences of different alternatives, even in complex situations where the outcome is difficult to predict. Despite such strong assumptions, this approach has proved to be highly rewarding and has enhanced our understanding of many economic phenomena.
"Empirical testing of postulates in economic theory confronts theoretical predictions with findings from real-world markets and economies. In general, however, since "field data" are affected by factors, which scarcely allow for control and measurement, the identification of causal relationships is problematic. Whereas economists have had to overcome such obstacles by using ingenious statistical methods, many natural scientists have been able to rely on controlled experiments to test their theories.
These common descriptions of theoretical and empirical economic science may well have historical validity. But nowadays, they both have to be modified. With increasing confidence, researchers in psychological economics have been able to demonstrate that in some situations, individuals do not behave like "homo oeconomicus". "Researchers in experimental economics have developed methods for controlled laboratory experiments in economics. A number of scholars have contributed to this development, including previous Laureates: Maurice Allais and Herbert Simon thus brought psychological perspectives into decision theory, while John Nash and Reinhard Selten conducted early experimental studies. But this year's Laureates are the key figures in these two fields. [……..] Although in an apodictical style, professor Lars-Göran Nilsson claims that the revision of the traditional theory of rationality has reached a critical juncture where its inspiring principles and its status as the microfoundations of economic analysis are being seriously called into question.
He emphasizes that experimental results were already questioning the validity of the standard model of rational action in the 1950s: Allais's experiments of 1952 and the empirical study of decision processes in firms conducted by Cyert, Simon and Trow in 1956 . Therefore the challenge to the theory of rational behavior initiated at the height of his success, culminated with the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by von Neumann and Morghenstern in 1944.
To understand the origins of the changes presently in progress, we must return to the 'golden age' of standard rationality theory: the 1950s. The successes achieved by linear and dynamic programming in those years seemed to justify unlimited faith in the ability of optimization models to explain all economically significant forms of behavior. There was a widespread conviction that it was invariably possible and justifiable to reduce macrophenomena to rational forms of behavior and to represent rational forms of behavior as problems of constrained maximization. Yet as the model of rational decision-making became increasingly well defined, so there was a corresponding extension of the domain of application; this extension led to a growth in the computational complexity and to advancements in the creation of new, sophisticated algorithms for optimization. This raised the problem of whether it was legitimate to ascribe individuals with the ability to perform extremely complex decision-making processes, resolving the problems connected with them by means of highly time-consuming and sophisticated algorithms, or whether the models of rational behavior should only be interpreted in a normative sense as techniques aiding decision-making and suitable for use by experts, not by common decision-makers.
It was this dilemma that prompted Simon to advance his hypothesis of bounded rationality and to launch his polemic against the idea of perfect and all-encompassing rationality. However, in those years a different solution of the dilemma was proposed by Milton Friedman, a solution that was very successful, providing a (fallacious) point of reference for mainstream theory.
According to Friedman, although individuals do not possess the formal tools with which to calculate the optimum adequately, they behaved as if they do -like bicycle riders who keep themselves in dynamic equilibrium even though they are unaware of the complex equations of the dynamics of motion, or billiard players who accomplish complex trajectories with their billiard balls although ignorant of the laws of rational mechanics.
Friedman, and the Chicago school of which he was a leading exponent, supplemented the 'as if' hypothesis with the further assertion that individual preferences were not observable, and indeed that they were irrelevant to proof of the validity of an economic theory (Friedman 1953) . In order to explain why this position enjoyed such prolonged success, even though it was substantially misleading, we must examine a bit more carefully the terms of the problem.
In its standard version, the theory of rationality rests on the following conception of human behavior: there exists a set of conceivable actions, which every individual may undertake and which lead to certain consequences. Individuals possess a mental order of preferences concerning all the possible consequences of their actions. They evaluate these consequences, and, given the constraints, decide upon a particular action. They therefore make their choice coherently with their preferences and with the constraints upon them. This way to proceed is defined as rational "calculation". According to these assumptions the theory of rational choice suggests (prescribes) to economic actors the best way to achieve their goals, and it is implicitly assumed (Milton Friedman explicitly did it) that those who failed to conform would be gradually excluded by a process of selection which permitted only 'rational' operators to survive. In this view it is therefore useless and uninteresting to investigate the psychological aspects involved in decision-making, because at most they could only aid explanation as to why certain individuals are unable to behave in an entirely rational manner.
The normative approach to decision-making theory was limpidly expounded in Lionel Robbins' Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economics (1932) , in which he defined economics as the science of choice. In this approach, "calculation" is therefore totally independent from individual mental activities and it is even irrespective of the mental processes of single individuals. The role of rational decision making theory is viewed as being fundamentally normative. This view has been shared by the vast majority of economists for just less than a century, according to the view and the definitions provided by Robbins. Robbins codifies a "post-Austrian" vision of the economic sciences statute in which economy and psychology must be considered fully autonomous specializations with equally independent statutes. As reminded by Schumpeter in his "History of Economic Analysis", the separation of economy from psychology, was ruled only after many decades of heated debates: "In principle, utility, be it total or marginal, was considered a psychic reality, a sensation that became evident from introspection, independent of any external observation […] with directly measurable proportions. I believe this was Menger and Böhm-Bawerk's opinion" (Schumpeter, 
History of Economic Analysis).
From the very beginning the resort to a psychological interpretation of "utility" was quite evident: "Ferdinando Galiani (Della moneta, 1750) defined utilità as "the power of a thing to procure us felicity." Similarly, Jeremy Bentham at first spoke of utility as "that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness" (An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1780) . But the meaning of the term has shifted continuously and even today "utility" circulates with various, albeit cognate, connotations. By referring to the principle of utility as the principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, Bentham himself paved the way for this terminological license. The ensuing confusion prompted W. Stanley Jevons to insist that "Utility is not an Intrinsic Quality," but "the sum of the pleasure created and the pain prevented" The introduction of utility as a psychological characteristic connected with the "value" of human activities led to the question of to measure the increasing or decreasing utility stemming from a particular choice. This view appeared unattainable to most economists; was Pareto that gave the proof that one did not need to resort to the utility function, but could set up the "new theory of value" on the ground of the simplest notion of preference: the winning analytical strategy consisted, in fact, in establishing some simple properties of preferences, completeness, transitivity, continuity and independence. These properties enabled the construction of an axiomatic model of the choice. It is mostly the contrast between the French and Austrian schools that fuelled the long evolution of the notion of utility until it eventually culminates into the codified version of Robbins, Hicks and Allen.
Slowly progression led to demonstrate that it was possible to adopt a utility function that could be used that was perfectly equivalent to the axiomatic model. In the 50s there were a series of incredible disputes and much confusion with regards to this issue, as illustrated by Schumpeter in his History of Economic Analysis. (1968) . But at that time the Pareto's approach was consolidated, and most economists shared the opinion that the theory "…. has a much better claim to being called a logic of choice than a psychology of value"( Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis). Behavior, published in 1944, von Neumann e Morghenstern make a further step in this direction; they provide an axiomatic approach to the theory of decision making in condition of uncertainty by formalizing the Expected Utility hypothesis, two centuries after Bernoulli original definition. Expected utility is nothing but a function of utility applied to cases of uncertain events, which features a particular property that can be illustrated in the following manner: faced with two different uncertain alternatives, x and y, which can occur with p and 1-p probability, a subject will compare the utility of each of the two options by "weighing them" in relation to respective probabilities: thus the expected utility will be: U= p U(x) + (1-p) U(y) . Though apparently innocuous, the assumption that in conditions of uncertainty individuals decide on the basis of expected utility, contains further restrictions compared to those relating to the utility functions in deterministic conditions, as noted by Allais (1979) .
In the Theory of Games and Economic
A debate over the notion of expected utility arose and lasted over a decade. It encompassed a number of controversies connected with the confusion generated by the epistemology of the Chicago school. Friedman and Savage's famous study on expected utility dates back to 1952. Here the authors try to construct an expected utility curve that is supposed to represent reasonably well, observable behavior at the aggregate level.
As we observed at the beginning, their approach consider as irrelevant the individual's expression of preferences, and therefore their method does not suggests to check individual's preferences: on the contrary they impose a-priori restrictions to the expected utility function based on characteristics related to the behavior of vast aggregates of individuals: for instance noticing that there is a large number of citizens that have a middle-low income that risks small sums of money on the lottery and on gambling, implies that they are risk taker; analogously, the fact that those same citizens insure themselves, means they are risk averse. The first property requires a convex utility function, while the second requires concavity. To take into account both these features of the population's behavior, Friedman and Savage suggest that the (aggregate) expected utility curve must have an "S" shape for the values of middle-low income. But Friedman constructs a general shape of the curve without testing the characteristics on a real population. In fact precise data on insurance were not taken into consideration and reliable data relating to the income of gamblers do not even exist. With regards to the way in which the notion of utility was defined during that period, Friedman and Savage's report seemed to be a considerable theoretical achievement. Yet this advancement concealed an untenable general epistemological approach that was unfortunately successful and remained for an extended period an unquestionable dogma for a vast number of economists. Maurice Allais's research proposed a counter trend to Friedman e Savage's approach. He carried out experiments on individual preferences that supplied experimental proof of some systematic failures of the theory's prediction. In 1952, at a symposium held in Paris, Allais presented two studies in which he criticized the descriptive and predictive power of the choice theory of the "American School" and especially Friedman's stance, (Allais, 1953) , demonstrating some experiments in which subjects underwent alternative choices in conditions of risk systematically violating the assumptions of the expected utility theory. Its investigation methodology overturns the prescriptions set by the Chicago school, as it is founded on observation of an individual's behavior, and introduces a method of experimentation with which the inherent difficulty of direct observation of individual preferences can be overcome by cross checking alternative choices. The experiments proposed by Allais are founded on two characteristic points: First, the properties of the choice that characterize the expected utility function must be identified in axiomatic form; the properties are: completeness, transitivity, continuity and independence. Second, subjects are presented with pairs of binary choices selected in such a way that one combination of the answers involves the violation of at least one of the axioms. This is what happened in Allais' experiments, in which the answer of a large part of the subjects shows a violation of some axiom of the expected utility function. This is one of the most known experiments: Do you prefer Situation A to Situation B? Situation A Certainty of receiving 100 million (Francs) Situation B: A 10% chance of winning 500 million, an 89% chance of winning 100 million, a 1% chance of winning nothing Do you prefer Situation C to Situation D?
Situation C An 11% chance of winning 100 million, an 89% chance of winning nothing, Situation D: A 10% chance of winning 500 million, a 90% chance of winning nothing Note that if Savage's postulate were justified, the preference A÷B should entail C ÷ D 1 . But the experiment contradicts this prediction:
"What one finds, however, is that the pattern for most highly prudent persons, the curvature of whose satisfaction curves is not very marked, and of who are considered generally as rational, is the pairing A ÷ B and CD. Thus contradicts the Savage's fifth axiom." (Allais, 1952) Violations like the one we have now shown could be interpreted as a sign of inconsistence in the system of preferences of individuals, though it was possible to suppose this inconsistence not to be systematic; perhaps it was for this reason that the initial reaction to experiment results was lukewarm: many believed that Allais' example could be an extreme case, not systematic, in view of the particularly elevated sums at stake; only later, after repeated experiments by Allais with actual modest sums conceded to players, the phenomenon emerged once again and was observed and thus had to be of systematic character. Since experiments showed a violation of the expected utility theory axioms, it was only natural to suspect that this violation depended on overly stringent characteristics imposed to the definition of expected utility function. Reaction to Allais's experiments led in fact to the proposition of more sophisticated versions of the utility theory in conditions of uncertainty, modifying or moderating certain axioms or generalizing their characteristics. As we shall see, this approach did not prove successful; rather it confined the problem to a very specialized sector, limiting the impact on microeconomics. In any case, in the scientific domain, both in the area of probability theory and in the field of economic theory of choice, the scope of Allais work was not appropriately valued; Arrow justifies this underestimation highlighting that if his study had been published by some of the most important American journals, future developments would have been achieved thirty years earlier. But this did not happen.
A parallel criticism: rationality within organizations
In the same period, from another viewpoint and a different context, the decision making model was about to be seriously questioned: the context was the analysis of administrative and managerial behaviour and, a behaviour that, until then, had completely defied rationality analysis, despite the fact that the rational planning analysis within organizations was highly developed. The success attained from methods of optimisation brought out two critical aspects: on the one hand the extreme sophistication of many optimisation models made it impossible to commonly apply them in organizations, on the other hand it was becoming clear that the quantity of calculation needed to obtain an optimal solution could be in some cases insurmountably high. It is within such a context, and from empirical observations on how organizations function, that limits of individual ability to make rational calculations were highlighted. The theory of limited rationality can be traced back to the collaboration of Herbert Simon with Dick Cyert, Jim March, and Harold Guetzkow at the beginning of the 50s at Carnegie Mellon. Their research programme dealt with realistic issues of economic organizations, in a period when the available conceptual apparatus was completely inadequate to the purpose.
The group collaborated to examine control methods of decisional processes in companies and the search was carried out from within the very companies analysed thus enabling an on-the-field study of the behaviour of managers and employees. The radical review of the two notions of rationality and organization that characterize Simon's vision compared with the neoclassical tradition originated from the extraordinary interaction of this group; in Models of my life Simon explicitly recalls that the group little by little altered the language of discussion, by progressively introducing some "semantic changes" that determined the emergence of new points of view on themes discussed: notions of bounded rationality, satisficing, problem solving were thus outlined, in a context of highly interdisciplinary analysis. The limits of the theory available to the group during that period were evident: the weberian analysis of rationality and bureaucracy that, filtered into economic models of rational decision, had experienced a prolonged success, revealed its limits when describing the behaviour of managers, founded on the ability to solve problems and innovate in ever changing situations. The traditional approach, as we have already mentioned, is centred on the decision making as a choice, and the construction of the decision context is considered secondary, as well as the discovery of alternative strategies. The shift of attention is in part due to the effects of the consumption theory as in this theory the consumption alternatives are assumed normally to be known by subjects, and the only significant problem lies in choosing the consumption plan that maximizes utility (expected) bearing in mind the limits in the availability of funds. However things are completely different when the same scheme is applied to contexts of production and organization. In such case then decisions are taken in an environment that is extremely difficult and at times impossible to evaluate all the alternatives available and their consequences. Exploration of this world produces the fact that the decision is nothing but a final act of a complex process that precedes it, through which the relevant information is gathered and the appropriate knowledge is structured; introducing the notion of limited rationality, Simon picks up on both of these proprieties of the decision-making process in the managerial context. He indicates that the real restriction to a rational decision lies in the need to construct the context of the decision. To do so one not only needs research all relevant information and must then construct a "mental model" representing the decisional context in the best way possible. The difficulty in fully representing the decisional context and to organize an appropriate mental representation comprising the limits of rationality.
The game of chess, though being an extremely useful context for the strategy construction analysis, shifted researchers' attention to the construction of winning strategies, like calculation. To understand the way a mental representation of the decisional context was obtained, Simon moves beyond the traditional notion of calculation, by, at first, introducing the idea of "symbolic manipulation" and then moves directly towards considering the cognitive processes: to discover the secrets of human cognition was believed by Simon to be an essential path to build artefacts of artificial intelligence. Artificial reproduction of this calculation, the making of programmes that enabled its realization, opened the doors to "artificial intelligence". In parallel Simon also worked on giving empirical analysis of cognitive processes a strong impulse. The starting point was an analysis of the game of chess, which Simon explored extensively from a theoretic viewpoint as well as from experiments he conducted on chess players. This examination supplies an evident example of the high complexity of constructing some relevant strategies. Experiments were carried out applying the "Protocol Analysis" technique: verbal ideas expressed during the game by players were taken down, showing from another viewpoint, the systematic violations of rational choice; in this case naturally the choices are inter-temporal, through which players elaborate and re-elaborate their strategies.
Hence, even in the field of limited rationality an essential method of psychological phenomena at the individual level emerges that is founded on direct empirical observation. Some of the complex elements that make up the puzzle of human intelligence are: induction, reasoning and problem solvingthe true protagonist that permits an understanding of economic and organizational phenomena.
The 80s: the revision of paradigm
The most natural route to move away from the impasse generated by the experiments of Allais was to consider the theory of expected utility too restricted and therefore to try to formulate an extended theory of expected utility. Many proposals arose in this direction, especially from the mid 70s onwards, all of which based on the attempt of relaxing or slightly modifying the original axioms of expected utility Theory. We will cite the following: the Weighted Utility Theory (Chew and MacCrimmon) assumes a weaker form of the axiom of independence; the Regret Theory proposed by Loomes and Sugden (1982) , and the Disappointment Theory, suggested by Gul (1991) Kahnemann and Tversky's approach was completely different and diverged in a crucial way from previous proposals as it was not limited to modifying certain axioms but rather, it restructured the problem, making reference to the mental processes involved. This theory also coherently fits within the analytical frame of Bounded Rationality and with the spirit of Simon, as the two authors explicitly acknowledge. In "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice", Tversky and Kahnemann (1987) , analyze the process of choice in conditions of uncertainty as something that has two distinct aspects: 1 -the editing of events into a mental representation 2 -an evaluation phase. An experiment they runs, that clearly elicits the two aspects, is the following one:
Problem 1 Assume to be 300 $ richer than you are today. Choose between -A the certainty of earning 100$ -B 50% probability of winning 200$ and 50% of not winning anything Problem 2 Assume you are 500 $ richer than today. Choose between -C A sure loss of 100$ -D 50% chance of not losing anything and 50% chance of losing 200$ Readers responding to the two problems will probably opt for the adverse risk option in problem 1 therefore choosing an earning that is certain (answer A). This occurred for the vast majority who participated in the experiment. Instead in problem 2 the answer is probably the one in favor of risking, thus answer B. It was noted that the majority, who picked answer A and D, violated the theory of expected utility (the independence axiom of the theory), as with Allais' experiments. After a simple reflection it becomes evident that the two problems, in terms of expected utility are the same problem; in fact, the entity's available wealth was considered after the choice had been made:
Case A 400 with prob=1 Case B 300 with prob=0.5 or 500 with prob=0.5
Problem 2
Case C 400 with prob=1 Case D 300 with prob=0.5 or 500 with prob=0.5
Therefore a large majority of individuals behave as risk takers when facing a problem presented in terms of loss (Problem 2) while they behave as risk averse when the same problem is presented in terms of gain (Problem 1). This behavioral inconsistency is called "framing effect", and shows clearly that the representation (framing) of a problem may be crucial to "order" the preferences.
Moreover, Kahnemann and Tversky observe that "…. the path of preferences observed in the two problems are of particular interest as they violate not only the theory of expected utility, but practically all choice models based on other normative theories. It must be noted that these data are not consistent with the "Regret" model proposed by Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) and axiomatized by Fishburn (1982)"
Again we have the confirmation that extended utility axiomatic theories, which propose an explanation to the violations of the expected utility theory by introducing new axioms or reducing the original ones, cannot attain experimental confirmation in all spectrums of experiments conducted so far (see Hey). On the contrary, numerous experiments have confirmed the framing effect described above in which in a risky decision entities behave favourably to risk, decodifying it in terms of loss, or favourable to risk if decodified in a context of profit. Kahnemann and Tversky's approach therefore appears to be the one that has attained the best experimental results and has had greater analytical potential. They suggest that in order to understand a decision one must thoroughly analyze the cognitive processes that are at the base of the decision. It is thus necessary to understand how people represent problems, how the complex process of editing is carried out and how construction of mental models is built in order to make a particular decision.
A suggestion that is closely related to Simon's framework of the decisional problem is: in his view the decision is the final act of a problem-solving process. The latter constitutes the heart of a subject's activities to face a decision, and who has to make a "rational calculation" to find out which is the best action strategy. This "calculation" though is carried out with strong restrictions due to the cognitive limits of an individual (bounded rationality); these restrictions can be generated by some systematic biases, that is, systematic deviations from what would be the results obtained by a "hyper rational" subject, an omniscient calculator of unlimited power The inconsistency of the last cornerstone in Friedmannian theory is thus observable: errors and violations of rationality are systematic, not biases randomly distributed around the predictions of the theory of expected utility. A number of experiments (Camerer) show in fact that subjects, once the biases connected to their choices are shown to them, only minimally adjust their behaviour. With the weakening of the Friedmann theory, the cognitive characteristics of the choice processes attained a central position again.
The evolutionary justification of rationality
Simon conducted pioneering analysis of strategic situations in which individuals are not able to fully explore all the consequences of their actions and hence to precisely evaluate them. In 1956 Cyert, Simon and Throw carried out an empirical analysis of managerial decisions which revealed an evident 'dualism' of behavior: on the one hand, a behavior guided by a coherent choice among alternatives, typical of structured and repetitive conditions; on the other, behavior characterised by highly uncertain and ill-defined conditions, where the predominant role was played by problem-solving activities. 2 "Decisions in organizations vary widely with respect to the extent to which the decision-making process is programmed. At one extreme we have repetitive, well-defined problems (e.g., quality control or production lot-size problems) involving tangible considerations, to which the economic models that call for finding the best among a set of pre-established alternatives can be applied rather literally. In contrast to these highly programmed and usually rather detailed decisions are problems of non-repetitive sort, often involving basic long-range questions about the whole strategy of the firm or some part if it, arising initially in a highly unstructured form and requiring a great deal of the kinds of search processes listed above." (1956, p.238) The core of the decision-making process is therefore the activity of search. The conditions for the standard choice theory to be applied are entirely lacking, because the preference orderings are highly incomplete, decisions are simultaneously inconsistent and choices are largely ineffective in relation to the goals to be pursued. The most important part of the process is driven by the ability of the subjects to formulate and solve problems. Bounded rationality, unprogrammed decisions and learning are the key aspects of human behavior in organizations under ill-defined conditions. This new vision leads March and Simon to completely redefine the description and analysis of rational behaviour within organizations, i.e. of "planning": in their view planning is based on "organizational learning", and is highly path-dependent: "….. when an organization discovers a solution to a problem by searching in a particular way, it will be more likely to search in that way in future problems of the same type; when an organization fails to find a solution by searching in a particular way, it will be less likely to search in that way in future problems of the same type. Thus, the order in which various alternative solutions to a problem are considered will change as the organization experiences success or failure with alternatives.
In a similar fashion, the code (or language) for communicating information about alternatives and their consequences adapt to experience. Any decision-making system develops codes for communicating information about the environment. Such a code partitions all possible states of the world into a relatively small number of classes of states. Learning consists in changes in the partitioning. In general, we assume the gradual development of an efficient code in terms of the decision-making rules currently in use.
Thus, if a decision rule is designed to choose between two alternatives, the information code will tend to confine all possible states of the world into two classes. If the decision rules change, we assume a change in the information code, but only after a time lag reflecting the rate of learning. The short-run consequences of incompatibilities between the coding rules and the decision rules form some of the most interesting long-run dynamic features of an organizational decision-making model." [Cyert and March, 1992, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, p. 174] The last part of this statement seems a re-elaboration of Hayek's ideas in his "Sensory Order", applied to the working of organizations. Learning and problem solving are considered the core features of organizations, through search processes. The idea that learning consists in changes in the classifications of the relevant phenomena has been confirmed and further developed by recent experimental results which have shown that the creation of mental categories to represent a problem is the basic driver for the decomposition of problems and therefore the source of the correlated biases in decision-making (Egidi, 2002) . Hence, a relevant conceptual improvement is that not only do organizations learn, but they make errors during this process, and -as March's behavioral description shows -since adaptation may easily lead to sub-optimal organizational configurations, errors may be systematic and stable in the long run.
In recent years, March and Simon pioneering views led to a large number of results demonstrating that biases in organizational decision may be persistent. Teams and organizations may remain trapped in sub-optimal routinized strategies, which are not changed even when they are highly sub-optimal. Levinthal and March (1993) single out a number of 'traps' into which an organization may fall during the process of organizational learning. In the field of evolutionary approach to organizations, Nelson and Winter emphasize that market mechanisms may not be able to select the best organizational structures and, again, inefficient firms may survive in the long run. Kauffmann' NK model, that I will very shortly describe hereafter, gives a vivid demonstration of these processes. The NK model has the following main features: the evolution of an organism, or in general of a complex biological system, is guided by its 'fitness', that is, by its reproductive success in the environment; the characteristics that determine the fitness of an organism can be represented in a discrete space because they are a list of 'traits' that can assume different values. In Kauffman's originary approach 'traits' can be proteins or genes, each of which can assume different "configurations" or "values" (alleles). An organism is characterized by N traits, each of which assumes a given value. A mutation is nothing else than a change in the value of a trait (allele), and therefore to explore the effect of single mutations on the organism fitness we have to change the values of the traits, one at the time. A crucial property of the traits is 'epistasis': when a mutation is introduced, it normally happens that the effect on the organism' fitness depends on the values of other traits. Call K the average number of genes that contribute to the fitness variation of the organism when a mutation occurs, i.e. the average number of epistatic interactions. K may vary from K=0 (total independence) to K=N-1 (total interdependence). In the first case, (K=0) the effect of a mutation on the fitness depends solely upon the single gene that is affected by the mutation; therefore by comparing the different effects of different mutations on the same gene, we can discover the allele that produces the higher increase on the fitness. If we sequentially do the same comparison on all the genes, we can discover for every gene the alleles that make the best contribution to the fitness; therefore we can increase the fitness of the organism until his maximum value, acting on every gene independently. This means that an organism with zero epistatic interactions may achieve an optimal configuration in response to a sequence of random mutations.
"The assumption that each gene contributes to overall fitness independently of all other genes is clearly an idealization. In a genetic system with N genes, the fitness contribution of one or another allele of one gene may often depend upon the alleles of some of the remaining N-1 genes. Such dependencies are called epistatic interactions " (Kauffman, 1989, p. 539 ).
Kauffman shows that as the epistatic interaction grows, the number of local optima increase, and an organism, which is affected by mutations, once it has reached a local optimum, may remain trapped. Therefore, the idea that rational behavior would in any case have emerged with evolution, and would eventually prevail due to the selective power of competition (Friedmann) no longer can be sustained.
Concluding remarks
With the formal demonstration that problem solving leads generally to sub-optimal stable solutions, the last cornerstone in Friedman's methodology becomes untenable: errors and violations of rationality are recognized as systematic, and the limits of rational behaviors can no longer be defended with the idea of a social process of selection of the best. With the weakening of the Friedmann approach, the cognitive characteristics of the choice processes are regaining ground in the long run debate between psychological and normative view. While the importance of the psychological aspects of decision-making is naturally emerging from the research conducted by Kahnemann and Tversky, these aspects are also stemming from Simon' bounded rationality approach. Both the bounded rationality and the behavioral economics approach holds that the crucial aspect of the decision-making process is the ability to construct new representations of problems. This point was already present in nuce in Simon's empirical analysis of managerial decisions conducted in the 1950s. The research we mentioned earlier, where Cyert, Simon and Trow pointed out an evident dualism in managerial behavior, was beginning to discriminate among two different aspects of decision-making processes: on the one hand the coherent choice among alternatives, on the other the search for the knowledge necessary to define the context where choices are made. The evolution of the analytical tools and the experimental outcomes is shifting the focus from the coherence/incoherence of choices to the representation and editing of problems. How mental models used by individuals and institutions to frame problems are constructed is becaming a crucial issue to be addressed by the decision theory, an issue that will yield a better understanding of human innovative activities within institutions. To follow such a course implies to inextricably connect psychology and economics: a demanding and relevant task, which raises questions on one of the fundamental statutes of the neoclassical construction of economic theory, Lionel Robbins' idea that economy is a normative science, whose tenet is the logics of the means and ends.
